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A B S T R A C T
European integration has raised hopes and concerns about
its effect on the distribution of power among different actors,
and in particular on the role of the civil society. Focusing on
the Europeanization of public discourse in Italy as a case
study, this article addresses the specific problem of the
formation of supranational public spheres. On the basis of
content analyses of daily press and interviews, we argue that
various forms of Europeanization of the public discourse are
indeed on the rise, with a growing presence not only of
purely European actors but also of European targets and
frames. Europeanization appears to have been traditionally
a ‘top-down’ process: in fact the more Europeanized is a
policy, actor, target or issue scope, the less civil society
actors seem to have access to the public sphere. However,
some changes across time emerge, with the development
of (conflictual) forms of ‘Europeanization from below’.
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The Europeanization of public discourse: An introduction
The growing competences of the European Union (EU) challenge parties,
interest groups, and social movement organizations that have mainly
developed at the national level. The European integration processes created
hopes and fears concerning the distribution of resources and power between
collective actors (Bartolini, 2002). Many studies have addressed the capacity
of the traditional actors of representative democracies to adapt to, or even to
take advantage of, European integration, focusing especially on their ability
to organize and act at the European level (for the most recent contributions
see Gabel and Hix, 2004; Steenbergen and Scott, 2004; Thomassen et al., 2004;
Wessels, 2004).
In this article, we want to address the issue of the impact of Europeaniza-
tion on national actors by focusing on their public discourse on European
issues. We consider the public discourse on Europe as a relevant issue in
normative as well as empirical terms. The accountability problem of inter-
national governmental organizations (IGOs) has usually been analysed in
terms of a lack (or a weakness, in the case of the EU) of those traditional
mechanisms of control developed in representative democracies: the ‘demo-
cratic deficit’ has indeed been mainly discussed in terms of the absence (or
limited competences) of elected bodies. Democracies, however, require not
only electoral bodies but also open arenas where public decisions are subject
to the ‘proof of discussion’ (Manin, 1995). In democratic deliberation, issues
referring to the public good are debated in public spheres of different types,
including the mass media (Habermas, 1981, 1991): free and equal individuals
hold governors accountable by engaging in discussions based on reason and
the public good.
A central problem connected to the shift of power to supranational
institutions is the difficulty of subjecting their decisions to the ‘proof of
discussion’. Some analyses have in fact linked the weak legitimacy of
European institutions to the weakness of the European public sphere as a
precondition for deliberative legitimization as well as representative account-
ability. The Europeanization of the public sphere has usually been considered
a delicate issue, in terms of both the flimsiness of the process (Gerhards, 1993)
and the lack of research on the topic (Le Torrec et al., 2001). Exploring this
issue further, a number of characteristics of EU politics have been held respon-
sible for the absence of a truly European public sphere: the democratic deficit
linked to the limited powers of the European Parliament; the secretive
working methods of the European Commission; and the intergovernmental
nature of the European Council. Characteristics of the EU’s media system
have also been mentioned when explaining the low level of Europeanization
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in political communication, for instance the tendency of journalists to use
traditional categories rather than describing the novel aspects of the European
enterprise; the lack of a common language and a unified public; the preva-
lence of national agendas even in relation to purely EU news; and the preva-
lence of intergovernmental and elite-driven images of the EU (the European
Commission, for example, appearing far more frequently than the Parliament)
(Gerhards, 1993; Le Torrec et al., 2001).
The (largely pessimistic) body of research on the European public sphere
mainly compares the latter with the forms and institutions of national public
spheres, and assesses the difficulties encountered in the emerging European
mass media, political parties, etc. In our work, we do not exclude the possi-
bility of the formation of genuine, supranational European public spheres,
yet we do speculate about the presence of different paths towards the Euro-
peanization of a specific element related to the debate on the public sphere –
public discourse, defined as ‘the “texts” emanating from the interaction of
people in public debate’ (Van de Steeg, 2002: 502), focusing our attention on
media texts.
We use the concept of Europeanization to refer not only to ‘the emer-
gence and development at the European level of distinct structures of govern-
ance’ (Risse et al., 2001: 3) but also to the impacts of these structures at the
domestic level in influencing the ways in which collective actors make their
demands visible in public discourses. In this sense, we address the ‘pro-
cessual’ aspects of Europeanization (Fabbrini, 2003) by analysing the recipro-
cal influences activated between the European and national structures – what
Radaelli and Franchino have recently defined as ‘bottom-up Europeanisation’
– to indicate a research design that is pitched at the level of domestic politics
and policy (national or local): it starts from ‘an analysis of the system of inter-
action (actors, resources, problems, style, and collective problem-solving
rules) at the domestic level’, and raises the question of ‘whether the EU affects
this system of interaction and if so in what way (as a resource, as a reformu-
lation of the problem, as a new set of collective problem-solving rules, as a
constraint on what is feasible, as an alteration to the opportunity structure,
as a new frame of reference, etc.)’ (Radaelli and Franchino, 2004: 948). We also
focus on domestic actors, looking at the ways in which European institutions
and European issues are discussed in public discourse.
In particular, an analysis of public discourse allows us to address ‘soft
pressures’ on European integration, expressed through the alteration of the
beliefs and expectations of national actors (Knill and Lehmkuhl, 1999). The
way in which Europe is framed by different actors, together with the role of
discourses and ideas, public debates, and political communication on Europe,
is in fact gaining attention in social science research on Europeanization. If
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traditional theories that see European integration as driven by national
economic interests provided little space for the role of national debates on
European issues, the emergence of constructivist theories in international
relations, as well as institutional analyses of Europeanization, has led to
increasing attention being paid to the ways in which national actors perceive
and define the process of Europeanization. Since the mid-1990s, there has
been a social constructivist turn in research on Europeanization, a turn
developed in order to study the impact of ideas and other socially constructed
elements on several policy areas (Quaglia, 2004: 1097). In particular, Euro-
peanization proceeds through the work of norms entrepreneurs that adopt
and adapt European frames (see, for instance, Börzel and Risse, 2000), and
Europeanization has an impact on the political discourses and ideas through
which national actors define and justify their choices: ‘Not only can Europe
affect formal structures, it can also influence the values, norms and discourse
prevalent in member states. In turn, cognitive transformation may change the
preferences of policy-makers and therefore feedback into the process of
European integration’ (Radaelli, 2000: 2; see also Schmidt and Radaelli, 2004:
184). We will indeed analyse how Europe is framed in the public discourse.
In this sense, Europeanization is measured not only by the active presence
of European actors but also by domestic actors’ references to European insti-
tutions and issues. If Europeanization produces multi-level governance, then
collective actions should adapt to intervening in and influencing the multiple
territorial layers of governance. As we shall see, domestic collective actors do
in fact seem to have adapted their action strategies so as not only to commu-
nicate with the various territorial levels of government but also to develop
strategies of ‘crossed influence’. That is, they attempt to apply pressure at the
national level in order to change decisions at the European level, or conversely
to apply pressure at the European level in order to change national decisions.
A typology of the different forms of Europeanization of the public discourse
can be built by combining the territorial scope of the claimant with that of
the target. In a fully supranational polity, all important claims would be made
by European political parties, interest groups, social movements and other
collective actors targeting the European institutions, or, as Imig and Tarrow
(2001b: 16) put it, ‘with functional interests mobilised through European
lobbies, territorial representatives organised in the EU Parliament, and state
interests represented in the European Council’. National public discourses
may, however, themselves Europeanize. This may, for instance, occur when
European actors exercise transnational pressure by intervening in national
public discourses, criticizing national policies or propagating European
integration. A third path to the Europeanization of the public discourse is
domestication, where debate over EU decisions takes place at the national level
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(Imig and Tarrow, 2001a). Domesticated claims are examples of claims-
making in which the EU or its policies are either the source or the indirect
target of claims by domestic actors, but where the direct target remains the
nation-state. In their analysis of protest in Europe, Imig and Tarrow (2001a)
stressed that most of the EU-related events that they singled out (406 out of
490) were cases of domestication, with an increase in all protest events from
about 5% in 1992 to 10% in 1997. Such mobilizations may be considered as
proof of the dominant position of the nation-state. However, a more careful
look shows the emergence, in the course of these campaigns, of innovations
both in the organizational structure and in the frames of the protests (della
Porta 2003a, 2003b). Finally, a form of externalization is present if and when
the mobilizations and communications of national actors target the EU
directly: this often takes place in an attempt to put pressure on the groups’
own governments (Chabanet, 2002).
Where the degree of Europeanization of public discourse proves to be
more relevant than expected, an important question is: who in the discursive
arena gains from this shift in the territorial level of debate? Amongst those
who stress the relevance of the process of European integration for national
collective action, positions diverge on its effects in terms of the empowerment
of different actors and coalitions. Some scholars expect that civil society
actors, owing amongst other qualities to the flexibility of their organizational
structures, will be able to adapt quickly to these changes (the increasingly
mentioned concept of ‘global civil society’ testifying to this expectation).
Others, however, are sceptical – not only that actors endowed with scarce
material resources will be able to invest in transnational organization-
building and the staging of supranational protest events, but also that they
can influence European politics ‘from below’ (della Porta and Tarrow, 2004).
European integration has had the predictable effect of multiplying both
restrictions and opportunities for various actors. Indeed, the construction of
community institutions, as well as the policies developed by the EU, is
increasingly the object of lively criticisms by loose networks of local, national
and transnational actors. As Hooghe and Marks (1995), among others, have
predicted, European integration no longer takes place under technocratic
cover; there is, instead, an explicit and continuous political conflict between
coalitions of governments, supranational bodies and national interests.
In particular, this article investigates the degree and forms of partici-
pation of various actors (institutional and non-institutional) in the Euro-
peanization of public discourse – that is, their capacity to take part in the
debates and mobilizations referring to European issues, targets and actors.
We will also focus on the evaluation of the process of European integration
by institutional actors, political parties, interest groups and social movement
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organizations, demonstrating that (different types of) actors are not merely
adapting to the transforming political context but also bearing specific visions
of ‘what’ Europe is and should be. In fact, qualitative information from inter-
views with representatives of several collective actors in Italy will indicate
that support (or criticism) of European integration can be presented within
extremely varied conceptions of Europe, which emerges in fact as an
‘imagined community’ that means very different things to different collective
actors (della Porta and Caiani, 2005).
In what follows we shall describe the significant and growing degree of
Europeanization apparent in Italian public discourse (see also Trenz and Eder
2004), albeit with a low presence of civil society actors. Our data indicate that,
the more Europeanized a policy, actor, target or issue, the less civil society
actors seem to have access to public discourse (at least in the mainstream
media). However, we observe some changes across time that display a slowly
emerging Europeanization from below. We shall, moreover, discuss the more
conflictual attitudes of some civil society actors toward Europeanization.
The Europeanization of public discourse: A research project
The first aim of this article is to assess and compare the degree and forms of
the Europeanization of public discourse. Thus, we investigate the extent to
which collective actors operating within (national) Italian public discourse are
carriers of Europeanization, by either organizing at the European level,
making demands on European institutions, or framing their demands within
European frameworks. Mainly using printed media as a data source, we
analyse the general features of political claims-making by various types of
actors, contrasting institutional and non-institutional actors – the latter often
being indicated by the (widely understood) category of ‘civil society actors’.
Focusing on the part of the public discourse represented in the printed
media does not imply that this is considered to be the only arena in which
claims are presented. In particular, some actors are less dependent upon the
mass media because they enjoy direct access to decision-makers; others are
less able to influence the mass media and therefore need to resort to alterna-
tive communication channels. Some may choose to address public opinion
because their claims resonate with the majority public opinion; others may
opt for less visible channels because they have more support among the elite
than in the wider population. However, we assume that the printed media
are one of the most important arenas of public claims-making, and that most
actors will, at one stage or another, use them in order to make their views
public.
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We shall analyse the presence of different types of Europeanization in
Italy, in a cross-time (1990, 1995, 2000, 2002) and cross-issue perspective (in
particular, besides the issue of European integration itself, we focus on six
substantive policy fields, chosen strategically in that they present varying
degrees of EU policy-making power). Our main assumption is indeed that
the degree and forms of Europeanization of the public discourse of different
actors will be influenced primarily by the political opportunities available for
them – i.e. by the set of opportunities and constraints that are offered by the
institutional structure and political culture of the political system in which
they operate (see e.g. Tarrow, 1994). In a system of multi-level governance,
we hypothesize a higher proportion of references to the European political
institutions and discourses in those policy fields, such as agriculture and
monetary policies, that fall under the first pillar, where EU competences are
strongest; an intermediate level of Europeanization in policy areas such as
migration and defence, which, although based on national decision-making,
are discussed in intergovernmental forums (such as the Council of Ministers);
and the least Europeanization on education and pension policies, which are
affected by EU institutions through the less intrusive instrument of the Open
Method of Coordination. Likewise, we hypothesize a growth of references to
the European political institutions and discourses over time as the European
integration process has deepened over the past 15 years.
Nevertheless, since the capacity to refer to the EU level is also related to
the characteristics of actors, including their material and symbolic resources,
we also expect important differences among collective actors within policy
areas. The process of European integration being mainly carried out by
government representatives and strengthening executive power at the
national level (Moravcsik, 1994), we also hypothesize a larger presence of
institutional actors in Europeanized debate. However, as the neo-functional
approach to European integration has suggested, growing European com-
petences tend to spill over into growing contention on European issues. We
therefore also hypothesize that strategically oriented actors will increasingly
address territorial levels with growing competences. Taking into account
symbolic resources as well, we expect that targeting the EU level will help to
spread supranational frames and identities, legitimizing European insti-
tutions even by contesting them.
Although the larger project of which this article is part includes seven
European countries, here we will draw only on data for the Italian case,
although we often compare these with the general trends in claims-making
that has emerged in the other European countries in order to underline simi-
larities and differences (based upon data available on the Europub.com
website).1 In general, Italy has been considered to be a particularly Europhile
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country, with citizens (as in other southern European countries) holding low
opinions of their national elites and being more confident instead in the func-
tioning of European institutions (Sánchez-Cuenca, 2000). Faced with corrup-
tion and inefficient public administration, public opinion as well as political
elites support European integration, which is perceived as an opportunity to
‘normalize’ the many Italian pathologies (Giuliani, 2000; Ferrera, 2003: 243).
In opinion polls, Italian scores on net support for membership in the European
Union were in line with the European average of 49% in 2000; this was well
below not only Luxembourg (75%) and Ireland (71%), but also the Nether-
lands (64%), Belgium and other southern European countries (all above 50%);
however, it was above West Germany (36%), Denmark (29%), the UK (5%)
and Sweden (1%) (Diez Medrano, 2003: 10). Generous allocations of cohesion
funds may have increased the traditional support for Europe that made Italy
one of the founding fathers of the first European institutions. A southern
European (less developed) welfare state has been cited as explaining high
individual support for European integration (Sánchez-Cuenca, 2000; Brinegar
and Jolly, 2005).
Bipartisan consensus on Europe was, however, challenged when the
corruption scandals of the early 1990s ended in the disappearance of the
Christian Democratic party and the emergence of the centre-right parties Lega
Nord and Forza Italia, both of which are much less supportive of the
European project. Qualitative research on the ‘framing of Europe’ yields
frequent references to the benefits of common membership in terms of well-
being and economic growth, as well as a belief in the advantages of joining
forces with several small states, but also fears that the EU is opaque, distant,
unaccountable and inefficient (Diez Medrano, 2003: Ch. 2). The enlargement
of the European Union on its eastern borders, as well as the introduction of
the euro and the austerity policy imposed in order to meet the Maastricht
criteria for entering the European Monetary Union, have however contributed
to breaking the permissive consensus around European integration. Most of
the trends that we shall mention in this article are shared across nations, and
the Italian case can be taken as an illustration of more general dynamics.
For the empirical data collection we use the methodology of political
claim analysis (see Koopmans and Statham, 1999, 2002), a quantitative
method that takes individual political claims as units of analysis and uses
newspapers as a source for the publicly visible part of this claims-making. A
claim is defined as an instance of strategic action in the mass media. It consists
of the expression of a political opinion by physical or verbal action, regard-
less of the form this expression takes (statement, institutional decision, court
ruling, protest, etc.), and regardless of the nature of the actor (media, govern-
ments, civil society actors, etc.). The claim analysis approach aims to integrate
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two methodological traditions of social movement research: (quantitative)
protest event analysis (Tarrow, 1989; Franzosi, 1994) and (qualitative) frame
analysis (Snow et al., 1986; Gamson and Modigliani, 1989). By systematically
coding discursive dimensions, claim analysis broadens the scope of attention
from protest to all forms of claims-making in the public domain, including
conventional and verbal actions. Moreover, it locates social movement
organizations within a larger multi-organizational field by including insti-
tutional and non-institutional actors. The main actors of claim analysis are no
longer ‘protesters’ but claimants, namely the subjects of a strategic action
(whether verbal or not) in the mass-mediated public discourse. Although the
use of the daily press as a source of information on protest or public discourse
has been criticized on the basis of the selection biases introduced by the rules
of journalistic coverage, in our research this risk is limited since we are inter-
ested specifically in public claims-making. Further, in order to reduce the
description bias (McCarthy et al., 1996), besides focusing on quality news-
papers (which have to protect their reputation), we based our coding only on
the factual coverage of events.
An act of claims-making can normally be broken down into the elements
shown in Figure 1: subject actor, form, addressee, issue, object actor and frame
(Koopmans and Erbe, 2002). In order to analyse degrees of Europeanization,
we coded the polity/territorial scope at which each actor, addressee, object
and frame are organized – distinguishing between local, regional, national,
transnational (multilateral/bilateral), European and supranational (e.g. UN)
actors.
Although our data set shows the claims-making of detailed categories of
actors (e.g. Italian unions, the Italian green party, etc.), our analysis in this
article will focus on the characteristics of the claims-making of general
categories of actors. Simplifying somewhat, we shall compare institutional
actors (government/executive, judiciary, police and internal security
agencies, military, central banks and other state executive agencies) with non-
institutional actors (which we shall refer to under the broad category of civil
society), including media and journalists, economic interest groups
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Who?
(Subject
actor) 
How?
(Form)  
At whom?
(Addressee
or target) 
What?
(Issue)  
For/against
whom?
(Object actor) 
Why?
(Frame)  
Pro-
immigrants
associations
engage in
a strike 
criticizing the
Italian
government
for the
treatment of 
some asylum
seekers 
arguing that respect for
human rights is a core
value of the European
Union 
Figure 1 Example of the ‘typical’ structure of a claim.
(composed of employers’ organizations and firms, farmers and agricultural
organizations, economists and financial experts and other professional
organizations and groups) and social movement organizations (composed of
unions and students’, peace, women’s, immigrants’, environmental,
consumer, welfare organizations, etc.). Unions have been included in the
category of social movements because first analyses showed that on several
dimensions they had the same trends and characteristics as other social
movement organizations. Farmers and agricultural organizations, however,
display patterns similar to those of other economic interest groups. When
members of political parties spoke as representatives of public bodies (parlia-
ments, governments, etc.), we counted them as institutional actors; when they
did not play this role, we included them in a subcategory of non-institutional
actors, thereby respecting the formal characteristics of parties as voluntary
associations (even if close to the state). Owing to the small number of claims
made by members of parties that do not speak as representatives of public
institutions, this choice does not affect the result of our analysis; moreover,
in the article we will often analyse trends for specific categories of actors, thus
indicating if specific trends for parties will emerge.
Our data were gathered from the news coverage of two quality national
newspapers that differ in political affiliation: La Repubblica (left oriented) and
Il Corriere della Sera (centre oriented). We coded the years 1990, 1995, 2000 and
2002. Articles relating to our six policy domains plus the topic of European
integration were collected from two issues per week for 2000 and 2002, and
from one issue per week for 1990 and 1995. For 2000, we also included two
regional newspapers (La Nazione and Il Mattino), of which one issue was coded
per week. The greater part of the database (90%) is constituted by articles from
the two quality dailies. Culture and sports sections, letters to the editor and
supplements were excluded from the coding; articles in the regional and local
sections (where present) were included only if referred to in the inter-
national/national news section of the paper. Data were coded on the basis of
a standardized codebook (Koopmans, 2002). All articles in the news section
and in the economic and business section of the newspapers were checked for
relevant acts. Inter-coder reliability tests were undertaken on both the selec-
tion of articles and the coding and, in addition, coders participated in regular
online discussions about difficult cases.2 In Italy, for 1990, 1995, 2000 and 2002,
1331 articles were coded for a total of 3541 claims. Among these, 957 claims
were selected for a reduced sample that included only articles with a European
dimension in either the claimant, the addressee, the issue or the object. The
remaining 2584 claims were selected from a full sample (all articles).3
In the last section of the article, we refer to yet another part of the 
research in which, between July 2003 and April 2004, we conducted around
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60 semi-structured interviews with representatives of the Italian organizations
that emerged as most important from the claim analysis in the fields of
European integration, agriculture and immigration. Interview partners were
selected according to two criteria. First, we referred to the results of the politi-
cal claim analysis (the frequency of appearance) concerning these three issue
fields. Then we integrated the lists of the most influential actors in the debate
with our knowledge of the core actors active in the policy domain under
study; we also consulted academic experts in each field for additional sugges-
tions. The semi-structured questionnaire focused on changes in the communi-
cation and mobilization strategies of collective actors related to the process
of European integration. Concerning the interview sample, in each of the three
policy fields, five interview partners were identified from four categories of
collective actor (government/administration, political parties, economic
interest groups and social movement groups), to make a total of 20 inter-
viewees in each policy field. Further details on the sampling of our interview
partners and the questionnaire used are available on the project website (for
a qualitative and detailed analysis of the interviews, see della Porta, 2004;
della Porta and Caiani, 2004, 2005).
The dominant Europeanization: From above
An important criterion for the analysis of the public debates and actions
concerning Europe is the extent to which different types of collective actor
participate in them. Which actors are the carriers of the Europeanization of
public discourse? Are they institutional actors, pushing Europeanization from
above, or civil society actors, bringing about a Europeanization from below?
Both the realist and functionalist standpoints perceive European development
as an elite-driven, top-down process. Institutional actors, at all territorial
levels, have been seen as the driving force behind policy-making (see Imig
and Tarrow, 2001a). Important studies in the field emphasize institution-
building as a formal process involving formal actors. However, much research
on the formation of nation-states reveals that, over and above constitutional
input ‘from above’, the construction of these territorial entities involved the
development of a common identity through participation ‘from below’.
Moreover, the development of a ‘European citizenship’ is a topic of increas-
ing interest to both scholars and policy-makers.
By looking at the Europeanization of public discourse by policy domain,
we can test the hypothesis that discursive references to the EU increase with
EU competences. The hypothesis that Europeanization is facilitated by the
availability of organizational resources is instead tested by comparing
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Table 1 Type of claimant by issue field: 1990, 1995, 2000, 2002 (%)
Non- Interest Social 
Issue field Institutional institutional Parties groups movements Media Total N
Monetary policies 71.3 28.7 4.3 14.5 5.6 4.3 100.0 516
Agriculture 54.4 45.6 – 26.6 19.0 – 100.0 79
Immigration 62.5 37.5 20.9 3.8 11.8 0.9 100.0 339
Troops 84.9 15.1 6.5 1.0 1.3 6.3 100.0 398
Pensions 44.1 55.9 14.9 10.4 28.8 1.7 100.0 288
Education 37.2 62.8 7.7 2.7 49.7 2.7 100.0 584
European integration 77.4 22.6 10.8 1.3 5.0 5.5 100.0 380
All policies 61.9 38.1 9.6 6.3 18.6 3.6 100.0 2584
Notes: Based on full sample issues only. Issue fields are: monetary policies: currency and interest rate; agriculture: subsidies, quotas, disease control;
immigration: entry and exit; troop deployment; retirement and pension schemes; education; European integration. Cramer V between the variable actor type
(social movements, economic interest groups, parties, media and state actors) and the variable issue field = 0.29*** (P  .001); Cramer’s V between actor type
(civil society and state actors) and issue field = 0.36*** (P  .001).
institutional and non-institutional actors. When looking at which types of
actors make claims in public discourse according to the seven policy domains
covered in our research (see Table 1), we notice a decline in the presence of
civil society actors in those fields in which the European Union has more formal
competences. In the fields of monetary policy and European integration, insti-
tutional actors monopolize the debate and civil society has a very low presence,
with the partial exception of economic interest groups and parties. The range
of actors involved in education and pension policies is more differentiated,
with a significant presence of civil society organizations. Nevertheless, the
correlation between the degree of institutionalization of EU competences and
a weak presence of civil society does not hold for troop deployment (low EU
competence combined with a low presence of civil society actors) and agricul-
ture (relevant EU competences but a significant presence of civil society actors).
In the debate on education, civil society actors are mainly constituted by non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) and social movements, whereas in the
debate on pensions the range of civil society actors is more evenly distributed
between parties, economic interest groups and social movements. In terms of
Europeanization, the data indicate that, in the Italian public discourse, issues
of European integration as well as those concerning monetary policy and troop
deployment are strongly debated within the institutional arena, whereas
discussions on pensions and education, but also the already Europeanized
domain of agriculture, are more pluralistic, involving a wider range of actors.
When looking at claim-makers, it is worth noting that, among European
and supranational/transnational actors, institutional actors account for the
vast proportion (88–94%). We find very few civil society actors organized at
the EU level (6%) and, where present, they more often represent institution-
alized economic interest groups than public interest associations and NGOs.
Surprisingly, non-EU supranational civil society actors, as well as forms of
transnational linkages among civil society actors through multilateral
contacts, are more present (12%) than EU civil society actors. These findings
indicate the constraints on the emergence of a transnational civil society that
could stimulate European integration from below, or at least high thresholds
for such organizations to appear in the public domain.
However, looking at the presence of European actors as claim-makers is
only one way to investigate the Europeanization of public discourse. Another
indicator of Europeanization, although of a different type, is the choice of
European institutions as the targets of collective demands. Table 2 shows that,
overall, although national (and subnational) actors are still the main focus of
collective mobilization and debate (58.3%), European actors and institutions
nevertheless have a role to play (17.9%). Even actors from other EU member
states have some role as addressees of claims-making, whereas supranational
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Table 2 Scope of the target by actor type: Selected policy fields, 1990, 1995, 2000, 2002 (%)
Local/ National National National Supranational
Actor type regional (Italy) (EU members) (non-EU) Bi/multilateral EU (non-EU) Total N
Institutional 2.3 37.5 11.0 15.3 3.0 25.5 5.4 100.0 888
Non-institutional 8.6 71.6 5.5 3.5 0.4 9.0 1.5 100.0 748
Parties 4.4 81.2 5.0 1.0 1.0 7.5 0.0 100.0 201
Interest groups 5.0 56.7 9.2 5.8 0.0 20.0 3.3 100.0 120
Movements 12.9 74.9 3.4 3.1 0.3 4.4 1.0 100.0 385
Media 0.0 38.1 16.7 11.9 0.0 26.2 7.1 100.0 42
All actors 5.2 53.1 8.5 9.9 1.8 17.9 3.6 100.0 1636
Notes: Based on full sample issues only. Cramer’s V between target scope and actor type (social movements, economic interest groups, parties, media and
state actors) and the variable issue field = 0.23*** (P  .001); Cramer V between target scope and actor type (civil society and state actors) = 0.41*** (P  .001).
and transnational (bilateral/multilateral) actors are rarely present. However,
what is most striking in the comparison between types of actor is that civil
society actors are significantly less likely to address their political demands
to European and supranational institutions than are institutional actors. The
exceptions here are economic interest groups and the media, which frequently
direct their claims to European addressees; parties show similar tendencies
to social movements.
A cross-policy comparison of the scope of the targets of different types
of actor points to important differences. There is a strong presence of
European addressees for both institutional and civil society actors on issues
concerning European integration, monetary policy and agriculture. In
contrast, little attention is paid to the EU as a target of claims-making on
issues of immigration and even less so on issues concerning education and
pensions. A fairly similar picture of low European targeting emerges in the
policy field of troop deployment, although here civil society actors address
their claims to European actors much more often than institutional actors do.
Another important indicator of the Europeanization of public discourse
is the scope of the issues that are mobilized by claims. Issue scope refers to
the geographical and/or political scope of the substantive content of the
claim. The issue scope is in principle independent from the scope of the
subject actor, target and/or object, referring instead to the framing of a
demand. For instance, if Amnesty International appeals to the European
Court of Justice in order to protest against the Milanese regulation that privi-
leges Lombards whilst discriminating against immigrants, the actor is supra-
national, the addressee is European, but the scope of the issue remains local.
However, if a local Milanese committee, acting in defence of migrants, criti-
cizes the Milanese city council for their migration policy on the grounds that
it constitutes a breach of the international conventions on human rights, then
the issue scope is supranational, in spite of the local scope of the actor and
addressee. This indicator allows us to investigate the ‘salience’ of the integra-
tion process in the everyday life of citizens: the question is whether the nation-
state remains the primary focus for debates, discourses and the formation of
collective identities, or whether, on the contrary, actors increasingly frame
their claims within a European dimension. In order to avoid overestimating
claims with a European dimension, in Table 3 and the following analyses
related (cross-time and cross-issue), claims in the field of European integra-
tion are not included, since their scope is by definition European.
In claims made by institutional actors, issues are often framed with
specific reference to Europe, whereas in claims made by non-institutional
actors national references remain more important (see Table 3). However, the
differences between the two types of actor in terms of the Europeanization of
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Table 3 Scope of issue by actor type: Selected policy fields, 1990, 1995, 2000, 2002 (%)
Local/ National National National Supranational
Actor type regional (Italy) (EU members) (non-EU) Bi/multilateral EU (non-EU) Total N
Institutional 3.2 33.4 4.1 3.5 18.1 22.9 14.8 100.0 1305
Non-institutional 7.6 62.6 3.1 4.7 6.8 11.9 3.3 100.0 899
Parties 4.8 67.7 2.9 0.0 12.6 9.2 2.9 100.0 207
Interest groups 3.7 40.3 5.0 10.7 2.5 32.7 5.0 100.0 159
Movements 11.2 72.8 2.4 4.5 3.0 5.0 1.1 100.0 462
Media 1.4 3.1 4.2 5.6 23.9 18.3 15.5 100.0 71
All actors 5.0 33.7 3.1 3.4 11.5 30.4 8.7 100.0 2204
Notes: Based on full sample issues only. Cramer’s V between issue scope and actor type (social movements, economic interest groups, parties, media and
state actors) and the variable issue field = 0.23*** (P  .001); Cramer V between issue scope and actor type (civil society and state actors) = 0.35*** (P  .001).
public discourse are slightly less evident than for the other previously
mentioned indicators. Amongst non-institutional actors, reference to the
European Union is very limited in instances of social movements’ claims-
making but is much more present in the claims of economic interest groups
and the media.
Yet here, too, there are significant differences between the issue fields.
Monetary policy and agriculture are often framed with specific reference to
Europe (64.0% of claims with a European issue scope made by institutional
actors, and 56.8% of those made by non-institutional actors for monetary
policy, and 44.2% and 30.6%, respectively, for agriculture). In immigration,
troop deployment, pensions and education, however, claims referring to the
European Union are present at only a very low degree, especially in the claims
made by non-institutional actors (4–9% institutional actors, 2–3% non-insti-
tutional). Unsurprisingly, for pensions and education – fields that remain
under the full control of national political institutions – public debate is almost
entirely concentrated within the Italian national space.4 Nevertheless, in these
fields, especially that of pensions, a small but significant portion of claims (in
the range of 7–9% for both types of actor) refers to other EU members.
These results may be explained by the tradition of institutional, biparti-
san support for European integration, as well as the weak structure of civil
society actors, but the Europub.com research project confirmed similar trends
in the other six countries covered (on the basis of as many as 20,000 political
claims collected from 28 newspapers). Across all countries, debates on
European integration (compared with those on the other issue fields) turn out
to be highly elitist. State and party actors dominate every issue field, but
nowhere as strongly as in the debates on European integration, where 81%
of the speakers are state or party actors (70% in the seven-issue average).
Economic interest groups and other civil society groups are much less promi-
nent in debates on European integration than in the other issue fields – respec-
tively, 2% (against 10% on average for all seven issues) and 5% (against 11%
for the seven-issue average) (Koopmans, 2004: 45).
The slowly emerging Europeanization from below
The Europeanization of public discourse seems, at first glance, to reduce the
opportunities for non-institutional actors: Europeanization appears to be
mainly imposed ‘from above’. This is no surprise. Research on protest events,
usually based on newspaper sources, stresses the scarcity of protests that
directly target European institutions. Using Reuters World News Service and
Reuters Textline, Imig and Tarrow (2001a) – the first to analyse protest at the
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EU level – found a very limited number of such protests. Similarly, in
Germany, Rucht (2002) has observed a low (and declining) proportion of
protests aimed at the international level (the highest levels being reached in
1960–4); he concludes that, ‘as far as Germany is concerned, the Europeaniza-
tion and, more in general, Europeanization of protest is a myth’ (Rucht, 2002:
185). Meanwhile Giugni and Passy (2002) noted how rarely protests on
migrants’ rights target the EU, notwithstanding the increasing Europeaniza-
tion of decisions on migration, at least in terms of access quotas and border
controls. Even environmental action is very rarely aimed at Brussels: protests
with EU targets ranged from 0.8% in Italy to 4.6% in Germany in the past
decade, with no discernible increasing trend (Rootes, 2002).
Our data, however, point to a significant and slowly growing adaptation
among non-institutional actors to the shift in competences and discourses to
the supranational level. In terms of targets and issue scope, the presence of
non-institutional actors has indeed been slowly increasing, although not in a
linear fashion, over the years in Italy (see Figure 2). In particular, whereas
claims with a national Italian issue scope have increased (although not in a
linear manner) for institutional actors (from 20.3% of claims in 1990 to 42.9%
in 1995 to 47.4% in 2000 to 35.7% in 2002), they have decreased for non-insti-
tutional actors (from 71.6% in 1990 to 79.5% in 1995 to 65.8% in 2000 to 64%
in 2002). Instead, it is the European level that has become more and more
prominent over the years, especially for non-institutional actors, who have
tripled these types of claim in more recent years (from 4.5% in 1990 to 17.3%
in 2000 and 15% in 2002, compared with institutional actors with 14.4% in
1990, 15.4% in 1995, 23.1% in 2000 and 36.0% in 2002). Relatively little atten-
tion, decreasing across the years, is paid to other EU countries by both types
of actor. Claims with an issue scope referring to other EU members repre-
sented a share of 5.9% and 3.4% for institutional and non-institutional actors
in 1990, 7.1% and 4.1% in 1995, 3.8% and 2.5% in 2000, 0.3% and 2.5% in 2002.
More precisely, in claims-making referring to Europe, economic interest
groups, social movements and the media in particular have increased their
presence over the years (economic interest groups from 11.1% of all claims in
1990, to 18.2% in 1995, 43.8% in 2000 and 42.4% in 2002; social movements
from about 3–4% of all claims in 1990, 1995 and 2000 to 12.0% in 2002; the
media from none in 1990, to 11.1% in 1995, 53.8% in 2000 and 15.4% in 2002).5
The proportion of claims addressed to EU targets also increased signifi-
cantly between 1990 and 2002 for non-institutional actors, and at a higher
speed than for institutional actors. Whereas in 1990 and 1995 only the media,
parties and economic interest groups addressed their claims to European
institutions, from 2000 onwards even social movements began to address the
European level; at the same time, other non-institutional actors were also
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increasingly targeting the EU (e.g. 5.6% of economic interest groups’ claims
had a European addressee in 1995, growing to about 25–28% in 2000 and
2002).6
This growing ‘Europeanization from below’ does, however, follow a
peculiar pattern. Applying our typology of forms of Europeanization to our
data on claims-making in Italy (Table 4),7 we can see that, overall, the Euro-
peanization of public discourse mainly assumes the forms of domestication
(34.6%) and externalization (31.3%). Supranational dynamics are also relevant
(24.6%), but transnational pressure applies to only 9.5% of cases. However, a
comparison of institutional and non-institutional actors points to important
differences in the forms of Europeanization. Focusing on claims made by insti-
tutional actors, supranationalization and externalization are equally
dominant forms of Europeanization (representing 30.0% and 33.3%, respec-
tively); domestication is slightly less significant (26.9%); and the intervention
of EU institutional actors targeting a member state is less frequent (12.5%), at
least in the ‘visible’ public discourse. If we focus instead on non-institutional
actors, we see that the prevailing type of Europeanization is domestication
(55.8%) but that externalization is also important (33.3%); the presence of
European social actors addressing either the EU (9.6%) or national govern-
ments (1.2%) is much less frequent, although not negligible. In more detail,
parties are most often characterized by forms of domestication in claims-
making with reference to Europe (70.0% of all claims), whereas Europeaniza-
tion via domestication covers about half of all claims among economic interest
groups, social movements and the media (46.5%, 53.4% and 42.4%, respec-
tively). Finally, economic interest groups and the media are the most involved
in forms of supranationalization of public discourse (about 15% of all claims).
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Figure 2 Share of claims with EU scope (issues and targets) across time, by actor
type.
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As for the temporal trends in the types of Europeanization, domestica-
tion has remained nearly constant across the years, representing about one-
third of claims; externalization and supranationalization have increased
slightly in more recent years (34.5% and 28.0%, respectively, of cases in 2000
and 30.7% and 27.4% in 2002, compared with a share of about 20–25% each
in 1990 and 1995). Domestication is typical of farmers’ protests: the majority
of farmers’ protests studied between 1992 and 1997 were aimed at national
governments and occurred within domestic political spaces, even if they
concerned European issues (Bush and Simi, 2001: 102). Comparative research
on Spain and the Netherlands has illustrated that farmers have continued to
hold their national representatives responsible, even if these have insisted that
the causes of the farmers’ grievances were beyond their control (Klander-
mans, 2001). Cases of transnational pressure are stable at about 10%.
Distinguishing the diachronic trends for different types of actor, we can
see that for non-institutional actors domestication was more common in the
past than in more recent years (moving from about 80% of cases in the 1990s
to 45.6% in 2000 and 54.8% in 2002). Externalization slowly decreased for insti-
tutional actors between 1990 and 2002 (remaining at about 30%), whereas it
increased for non-institutional actors (from 10.0% in 1990 to 40.8% in 2000 to
35.2% in 2002). Transnational pressure is virtually absent for non-institutional
actors across the years, and it has remained at a nearly constant level of about
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Table 4 Forms of Europeanization of the public sphere by actor type (%)
Scope of the target
—————————————————————————–
Scope of the claimant National EU
Domestication (1) Externalization (2)
Type of actor
National Non-institutional 55.8 33.3 N = 249
Institutional 26.9 30.6 N = 687
All actors 34.6 31.3 N = 936
Transnational 
pressure (4) Supranationalization (3)
EU Non-institutional 1.2 9.6 N = 249
Institutional 12.5 30.0 N = 687
All actors 9.5 24.6 N = 936
Notes: Based on both samples, but including only cases with a European issue scope. Cells show
percentages calculated on the total. Cramer’s V between scope of the claimant and scope of the
target = .23*** for all actors (N = 936); .32*** for civil society actors (N = 249); .18*** for state
actors (N = 687).
12–13% for institutional actors. Finally, forms of supranationalism increased
for institutional actors (from 30.0% in 1990 to 37.0% in 2000 and 32.5% in 2002)
but not for civil society.
To conclude, non-institutional actors seem to have more difficulty in allo-
cating resources in order to build European organizational structures.
However, even if transnational civil society organizations are still rarely
present in the Europeanized public discourse, the tendency to address the EU
is not insignificant. The construction of community institutions, as well as the
policies chosen by the EU, is increasingly the object of vigorous responses by
loose networks of local, national and transnational actors.
Consensual Europeanization or conflictual
Europeanization?
Another relevant dimension to investigate is the degree of conflict in the
process of Europeanization. That is, if we find claims concerning Europe, are
they supportive or critical of the European polity, politics and policies? The
development of territorial politics follows both consensual and conflictual
paths. The nation-state evolved through conflicts of greater or lesser degrees
of politicization between the centre and the periphery, between the church
and the state, with both cleavages contributing to shaping the characteristics
of national politics (Rokkan, 1982). The mobilization of other cleavages, in
particular social class divides, also contributed to the building of the nation-
state, and the struggle to construct a national polity interacted with the
production of national policies (Bendix, 1964). Conflicts can (and do) develop
around both the very existence of a European polity and the specific policies
implemented by European institutions. In this section, we shall investigate
some characteristics of consensual versus conflictual forms of Europeaniza-
tion, comparing institutional and non-institutional actors.
Many studies have indicated a decline in support for the EU in public
opinion, stressing the erosion of the ‘permissive consensus’ based on bureau-
cratic legitimacy (Eder, 2000: 179–80). Together with the growth of protest
targeting the EU (Imig, 2004), the decline of trust in European institutions is
an indicator of the weakening of EU legitimacy by ‘output’ legitimacy secured
by the efficacy of policy outcomes, rather than legitimacy secured by repre-
sentative ‘input’ procedures (Scharpf, 1999).
Our data confirm a growing dissatisfaction with the functioning of the
EU, but also tensions between different images of Europe, supporting the
hypothesis that growing competences bring about increasing contestation. In
Table 5 we show the distribution of conflictual claims by type of actor, in both
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domestic and ‘European’ claims-making.8 In the operationalization of
domestic claims, we consider only those with a national issue scope (N =
1332). Overall, the extent of conflictual claims is lower in European (28.6%)
than in domestic claims-making (36.1%). Nevertheless, Europeanized conflict-
ual claims have increased, although not linearly, over the years (from 21.2%
of all EU-based claims in 1990 to 34.7% in 1995, 30.7% in 2000 and 27.1% in
2002), whereas the proportion of conflictual claims in the domestic debate
remained nearly constant at about one-third of the sample.
We may add that civil society actors (in particular, social movements and
parties) are much more conflictual than institutional actors, even in claims-
making with reference to Europe. Conflictual politics may be more present
in national than in European politics, but the degree of conflict in claims-
making has increased across the years in Europeanized policy fields.
Contrary to the expectation that channels for including ‘civilized’ actors in
EU policy-making would tame civil society organizations (see, for instance,
Mazey and Richardson, 1993), non-institutional actors are more conflictual
than institutional actors even when addressing issues of EU scope, and they
do not appear to moderate their repertoire of action. Imig and Tarrow (2001a:
43) also find that, concerning repertoires of EU conflictual politics from 1984
to 1997, conflictual actions continued to represent a substantial share of
claims-making addressing the EU.
In order to delve more deeply into the attitudes of different types of actor,
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Table 5 Conflictual claims by actor type in EU-based claims vs. non-EU-based
claims: Selected policy fields, 1990, 1995, 2000, 2002
EU-based claims Domestic claims
————————————— ———————————————
Conflictual Total Conflictual Total
Actor type claims (%) (%) N claims (%) N
Institutional 24.4 100.0 1236 17.3 100.0 612
Non-institutional 42.2 100.0 389 52.1 100.0 720
Parties 44.8 100.0 125 49.4 100.0 160
Interest groups 32.8 100.0 116 37.6 100.0 101
Movements 59.0 100.0 83 58.7 100.0 429
Media 32.3 100.0 65 20.0 100.0 30
All actors 28.6 100.0 1625 36.1 100.0 1332
Notes: Row percentages are shown. Cramer’s V between presence of conflictual claims and actor
type (social movements, economic interest groups, parties, media and state actors) .20***,
calculated for EU-based claims; .36*** for domestic claims.
we can look at our data on the position of claims-makers on the issue of
European integration. Are the claims against any deepening of the integra-
tion process, or do they imply an extension of the competences of European
institutions? Valence position scores on Europe/European integration range
in our coding from –1 (against a deepening of the integration process) to +1
(in favour of deepening integration and the extension of the rights and posi-
tions of European institutions and regulations; a 0 score indicates claims that
are neutral or ambivalent in this respect). In Figure 3, we show the score of
the average valence position on Europe for each collective actor, calculated
by aggregating the position scores of that actor’s claims.9 The overall debate
in Italy about Europe appears to be characterized by a positive attitude
toward Europeanization (+.24), confirming other data about the pro-
European sentiments present in Italian public opinion (della Porta, 2003c:
20–3). In a cross-national comparison with the Europub.com countries, Italy
ranks third in support for the process of European integration (after Germany
and France) and is followed by Spain, the Netherlands and the UK
(Koopmans, 2004: 45).
Institutional actors have more positive attitudes towards European inte-
gration, although their support for Europe is not characterized by a linear
trend over time. Civil society actors are in general less enthusiastic about the
European integration process, with an increase in support for Europe up to
2000, followed by a sharp decrease. Among the non-institutional actors,
economic interest groups have a slightly more pro-European position, and
social movements and the media are more critical of European integration.
In public positions on Europe, then, integration seems to be a project more
dear to the political and economic elites than to civil society actors, who,
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Figure 3 Positions on European integration by actor type (mean values).
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although not homogeneously, feel that they are on the losing side. In cross-
national comparison, support for the integration process is everywhere
stronger among institutional and party actors (+.26 across all seven countries)
than among various categories of non-institutional actors – economic interest
groups (+.12), the media (+.13) and other civil society groups (+.13). The
stronger socioeconomic actors (employers and business organizations) are, in
most countries, more supportive of the integration process (+.20) than are
trade unions (+.12). In Italy, unions emerge as particularly critical of the
process in comparison with the more general European trend (–.13;
Koopmans, 2004: 43).
However, the support of every type of actor declines after 2000. In Italy,
the cross-time analysis shows a decrease in support for Europe from +.30 in
1990 to +.11 in 2002. Once again, this is similar to the general trend emerging
in the other European countries covered by the Europub.com project: the
average mean for support for Europe of the seven European countries fell
from +.39 in 1990 to +.19 in 2002 (Koopmans, 2004: 43).
The general attitudes towards Europe of the different types of actor vary
greatly according to the issue under debate. In a cross-issue perspective, civil
society claims on European issues that explicitly express a positive attitude
to increased Europeanization are at a high level for European integration
(+.16) and agriculture (+.18). Education is the policy field where non-
institutional actors mostly express criticism on European integration (–.11).
Institutional actors, in contrast, appear more cautious in supporting Europe
in claims-making concerning agriculture (+.07) and troop deployment (0.00),
as well in debates concerning monetary policy (+.15).
The attitudes of civil society actors towards the European process are also
strongly differentiated across policies. Economic interest groups are more
critical of Europe when the debate specifically concerns EU integration (–.09)
and more favourable when the claims-making concerns pensions (+.29), agri-
culture (+0.18) or monetary policy (+.16). Social movements, in contrast,
express more positive positions regarding Europe in the debate concerning
European integration (+.24) than when they talk about pensions (–1.00) or
education (–.17).10
Conflict related to the process of European integration is especially high
on issues relating to the welfare state and social rights, where the European
Union is not considered to have a good track record. These results, which
concern much more than the general process of European integration, there-
fore seem to point to dissatisfaction among non-institutional actors with EU
politics, confirming the worry that a lack of ‘positive integration’ (Scharpf,
1999) is weakening support for Europe among citizens concerned about
welfare issues.
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These findings on the conflictual participation of civil society actors may
be better interpreted by turning to the qualitative data generated from our
interviews. The interview partners were asked about their general percep-
tions and evaluation of the process of European integration, and how they
judged the role and performance of EU institutions in this context (‘How do
you perceive the process of European integration more generally? What direc-
tion is it taking? Do you agree with this development? And how do you see
the role and performance of EU institutions in this context?’). The analysis of
the attitudes of various national actors towards Europe confirms broad
support for European integration, but in terms of very different conceptions
of Europe. Europe emerged as an ‘imagined community’ that meant very
different things to different collective actors. In the 1990s, in particular, the
European one was part of a multi-level territorial identity compatible with
other territorial identities (Fabbrini, 2003: 19). But different actors also tend
to construct different Europes. In part, these definitions overlapped with the
traditional distinction between Europe as an economic enterprise, based on
the pragmatic support of national economies (which appeared to be the view
characteristic of many institutional actors), and Europe as a federation based
upon a common destiny and common values, with a particular commitment
to peaceful interaction (which is the ‘model’ mentioned most often by non-
institutional interview partners). For example, when considering actors’
expectations and normative statements about the future of European integra-
tion, institutional actors worried more about instrumental/economic issues
(confirming the image of a ‘regulatory’ Europe), whereas civil society actors
focused on the political and social construction of Europe.
From the instrumental point of view, enlargement and the euro are
perceived by centre–right institutional actors and interest groups as challeng-
ing decisions, especially in a period characterized by economic difficulties
(see, for example, interviews 11, 12 and 1311). Enlargement, in particular, is
considered to be risky by those who conceive of European integration as
mainly legitimized by economic advantages – all the more so for a country
that has, until now, enjoyed high levels of EU funding for cohesion policies.
In the more Eurosceptic definition, enlargement is ‘an acceleration that does
not take into account the problems of the assimilation of the member states’
(Lega Nord, interview 14).
Most civil society actors focused instead on identity issues – demanding
a democratic and social Europe, but criticizing the EU’s weakness on both
issues. As for the ‘democratic deficit’, many NGOs stressed the need for a
‘bottom-up’ process to develop European politics. As the general secretary of
the Movimento Federalista Europeo sums it up: ‘The EU Council is not 
good because, from the point of view of constitutional doctrine, it is not a
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democratic institution’ (interview 1). Similarly, other social movement
organizations complained about the weak powers of the European Parliament
vis-à-vis the European Council (see, for instance, interviews 2 and 6), arguing
that ‘the construction of the European Union comes from the top and there
is no low level, except for the movements that attempt to influence ‘high
politics’’ (interview 5).
More generally, civil society actors are critical of the direction of European
integration, but not on the basis of a traditional ‘nationalist’ Euroscepticism
that defends the nation-state (Marks, 2004). Criticisms are framed using the
language of class cleavages rather than territorial ones. Although social
movement organizations agree on the importance of a European level of
government and citizenship, they stigmatize EU policies as being oriented
towards economic success instead of social equality, ‘privileging the market
over the people’. As the spokesperson for Rete Lilliput, a network of NGOs
working on global inequalities, stressed: ‘We are favourable to the process of
integration but we don’t agree with the political direction it is currently
taking’ (interview 10). The representative of the ‘critical’ union Cobas (inter-
view 3) confirms this image of the EU as a neo-liberal institution, interested
in economic growth but not in social equality: ‘I disagree with the direction
of the process of integration because it is primarily an economic, a financial
one. It is not integration by popular consultation’; a ‘Europe that liberalizes
more and more the free movement of commodities and dirty money but not
persons. It condemns thousands of citizens to death with its restrictive laws
on immigration’ (interview 4).
To summarize, the need to construct a supranational level of governance
is recognized but the weakness of political and social Europe is criticized.
This tension between general support for Europe and criticisms of specific
EU policies is acknowledged by, amongst others, the leader of the farmers’
organization Altragricoltura, who stated:
We are critical of the fact that integration is only a conquest of markets, and that
there is no reflection upon what kind of Europe we want. The European Union
is the only opportunity we have for imagining a different model of economic
development from the American one. We defend this possibility but we don’t
agree with the reality of the European Union’s concrete choices; we are living a
contradiction. (Interview 8)
Our interviews with various types of non-institutional actors indicated,
however, that although civil society organizations are more critical than
institutional actors (in terms of their position on increasing European integra-
tion), such organizations (including social movements) have very high levels
of interest in the development of European policies and consider the EU level
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to be very important for the present as well as for the future. Social move-
ments express the least support for the European Union, but they show a
higher level of interest in it than political parties do; they share a fairly strong
belief in the relevance of the European policy level, and an even stronger
confidence in its future influence.
The Europeanization of public discourse and civil society:
Some conclusions
Our data indicate that, at least when looking at Italy, there is a certain degree
of Europeanization of public discourse in terms of the presence of European
claimants, targets and framings of issues, but that this process has specific
characteristics. It is selective, insofar as it involves some policy areas but not
others; it is mainly top-down, in the sense that non-institutional actors are
less present than institutional ones in public debates on Europeanized issues;
and it is increasingly contested, in Italy not so much in terms of opposition
to a European polity (i.e. to the building of new geographical borders), but
more on the basis of specific European policies (in particular, the weakness
of social policies) and European politics ( the ‘democratic deficit’ is linked not
only to the weakness of the elective EU body, the Parliament, but also to the
lack of transparency of European integration processes) (della Porta et al.,
2003; della Porta and Caiani, 2004; della Porta, 2003b). Other recent studies
have found similar results in other countries, indicating a certain general
degree of Europeanization (Koopmans, 2004; Trenz and Eder, 2004) accom-
panied by issue specificity (Seidendorf, 2003).
Principally, our results have confirmed that, in terms of political oppor-
tunities, multi-level governance is reflected in domestic public discourse. As
expected, Europe is more widely discussed in those policy areas where the
EU institutions have more competences (especially in monetary policy), but
some degree of Europeanization also emerged in policies that remained more
within the control of national institutions. Moreover, public discourse on
European actors and issues became more and more prominent over time.
Even if European institutions function as an additional level of oppor-
tunity, our research confirms that the ability of collective bodies to access
supranational levels depends upon their ‘regulative, jurisdictional and
material resources’, and that ‘European integration distributed these oppor-
tunities of access to extraterritorial resources . . . in a differential and unequal
way’ (Bartolini, 2002: 8; emphasis added). In Italy, although also in other
European countries (Koopmans, 2004), acting at the supranational level seems
relatively less expensive for actors that are already resource rich at home. In
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Table 6 Position towards Europe by type of actors: Interviews (mean values)
Importance of the EU Importance of the EU 
Support for EU Interest in EU policy policy (today) policy (future)
————————————— ————————————— ————————————— —————————————–
Std. Std. Std. Std.
Actor type Mean N dev. Mean N dev. Mean N dev. Mean N dev.
Institutional .88 13 .2 .96 13 .1 .67 2 .0 1.00 5 .0
Parties .69 13 .3 .65 12 .2 .64 11 .2 .90 10 .2
Interest groups .88 16 .2 .77 15 .2 .69 16 .3 .98 16 .1
Movements .47 18 .4 .74 18 .3 .65 18 .2 .90 18 .2
Total .72 60 .3 .78 58 .2 .66 47 .2 .94 49 .1
addition, limited references to Europe by non-institutional actors indicate that
as a result of an initial focus on the negative aspects of integration – in particu-
lar on the free market and economic competition – Europe still does not give
much symbolic leverage to actors advocating EU citizenship as including the
protection of social rights. The higher level of reliance on institutional sources
by journalists covering supranational issues also seems to play a role in
limiting the presence of civil society actors in these debates (Bennet et al.,
2003). When looking at public discourse, it seems that the processes of Euro-
peanization strengthen those who are already strong nationally, while further
marginalizing the weak.
Nevertheless, the growing Europeanization of claims-making by social
movements and associations indicates that (although perhaps making a virtue
of necessity) civil society actors realize that they cannot remain confined to
their own nation-states. If decisions shift to the supranational level, then
claims-makers must adapt accordingly and try to reduce their disadvantages
in addressing a new level of governance. For resource-poor collective actors
in particular, it seems important to combine different territorial levels of inter-
vention by framing concerns in a more European dimension while simul-
taneously holding on to potential allies in national politics.
The Europeanization of public discourse does not imply increasing
consensus on the EU polity or policies. Our data indicate that European inte-
gration also involves the interplay of territory and class (or, at least, left–right)
cleavages, although not to the same extent as occurred during the construc-
tion of the nation-state. The Europeanization process is, in fact, more and
more conflictual – including within public discourse. Together with the
growth of protests addressing European targets (Imig, 2004), decreasing
support for European institutions indicates the failure of output legitimiza-
tion based upon results rather than input procedures. Long before citizens in
France and the Netherlands voted against the European Constitution, opinion
polls had signalled a decline in citizen satisfaction with the development of
EU institutions, with about half of Europeans dissatisfied (Pache, 2001;
Méchet and Pache, 2000), and European institutions are regularly criticized
for being ‘bureaucratic, inefficient and for lacking transparent procedures’ (Le
Torrec et al., 2001: 8). The output of the EU seems insufficient, if not negative,
to many collective actors. In particular, with reference to the interaction
between territorial and social cleavages, our research confirms the presence
of a tension between a vision of Europe as promoting a regulated capitalism
that addresses social concerns and a neo-liberal vision that is opposed to the
expansion of EU competences and instead promotes deregulation (as stressed
by Hooghe et al., 2004; Marks, 2004).
Our research suggests that the growing criticism of the EU does not
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necessarily take the form of Euroscepticism. Even if, in Italy, support for
European integration tends to remain widespread, there has been a recent
increase in contestation of the direction of EU policies, particularly among
non-institutional actors. Our research allows us to go beyond the observation
of a growing scepticism in order to distinguish the image of Europe around
which consensus and/or dissent emerges. The specificity of a ‘critical consen-
sus’, especially on the Left, can be explained by the characteristics of the
European construction process and its inherent tension between instrumen-
tal and identitarian images, which prevail, respectively, among civil society
and institutional actors. Ever since its beginnings, the EU has in fact been a
reaction to the weakening of the European nation-state in certain key areas –
from the military defence of frontiers to the expansion of markets. As Bartolini
puts it, the process of territorial de-differentiation that is at the root of
European integration ‘finds its initial inspiration in two elements of the new
international constellation that followed on from the Second World War. The
first was the evidently intolerable cost of historical rivalry between the
European states in an era when the destructiveness of war technology had
grown out of all proportion to what was at stake in said rivalry. The second
was the growing pressure coming from the potential economic marginaliza-
tion of Europe in the world economy’ (Bartolini, 2002: 405). The de-territori-
alization of defence and the market that was the foundation of the European
construction stood, however, in contrast to the maintenance at the national
level of decisions over redistribution issues. Even more problematically,
where member states have retained their competences on social policies (and
in particular, as we have seen, on education and pensions, which are areas
strictly related to national integration), monetary policies (and the related
‘stability pact’) have deprived national governments of some of their main
instruments for intervening in matters of social inequality.
To conclude, our research confirms that European integration demands ‘a
commitment to construct a system, that involves the creation of at least a level
of cultural identity and of citizenship able to sustain the principle of social
sharing of risks and mechanisms of legitimate political decisions’ (Bartolini,
2002: 412). The EU’s launching of campaigns on general ethical issues, such as
gender equality, anti-racism and human rights (Trenz, 1999), is evidence of the
search for a moral basis for a collective identity. Such a moral basis would be
equivalent to what the nation represented in the construction of the state. Our
research singles out this need and the dissatisfaction with the EU’s response
to it, which is judged to be hopelessly inadequate.
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We wish to thank Claudius Wagemann for his dependable and patient help with
statistics, Sara Valenza and Linda Parenti, who collaborated on content analysis
and interviewing, Lorenzo Mosca and Massimiliano Andretta, who participated
in various steps of the Italian project, the project coordinators Ruud Koopmans
and Paul Statham, as well as all other members of all national teams.
1 This article reports results from research carried out in Italy. The research
forms part of a larger cross-national project on ‘The Transformation of Politi-
cal Mobilisation and Communication in European Public Spheres’
(Europub.com), coordinated by Ruud Koopmans and sponsored by the
European Commission in the context of its 5th Framework Programme (HPSE-
CT2000–00046). For an outline, see Koopmans and Statham (2002), available
on the project website at http://europub.wz-berlin.de. Integrated reports of
the results of the claims-making analysis of the Europub.com project for the
United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and Switzer-
land, as well as separate reports on each of our seven countries, are available
at http://europub.wz-berlin.de/project%20reports.en.htm.
The Appendix to this article containing the interviews can be found on the
EUP webpage.
2 The reliability coefficient for the identification and delimitation of claims was
.89. For the variables used in this paper, reliabilities ranged from .85 to 1.00.
3 In the following analyses we balanced the sample of claims from 1990 and
1995 by assigning them double weight. Furthermore, because only half of the
sample (namely 26 days when claims were coded for 1990 and 1995 and 52
when they were coded for 2000 and 2002) contains all the articles found on
the selected issues, while in the other half of the sample (again 26 days for
historical years, and 52 days for the most recent) only claims with a European
scope in at least one of the basic aspects of the claim (actors, addressees, issue)
were coded, we based most of our analyses on full sample issues only. By
doing this we avoid overrepresenting claims with a European dimension,
thus drawing a fair picture of the degree to which ‘Europe’ is present in the
national public sphere. We indicate in the text when the reduced sample is
added.
4 In general, as many as 83.5% (institutional actors) and 92.5% (non-insti-
tutional actors) of all claims on pensions and about 90% (for both types of
actor) of all claims on education have a national, Italian issue scope. Monetary
policy claims with a national issue scope account for a share of 9.5% for insti-
tutional actors and 19.6% for non-institutional actors; claims on agriculture
for 18.6% and 44.4%; claims on immigration for 61.3% and 83.5%; and claims
on troop deployment for 0% for both types of actors.
5 For parties, claims with a European issue scope remain nearly constant across
the years (about 6–7%), with a significant peak in 1995 (15.6%).
6 Claims directed to other EU member states slightly decreased for state actors
(from 15.0% in 1990 to 7.4% in 2002), whereas for civil society actors they
remained nearly constant at about 3–4%.
7 For the typology and the related analyses, we considered only claims that
have a European issue scope, in order to obtain a data set of claims launched
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in response to the policies or institutions of the EU (EU-based claims).
According to this criterion, we selected 1625 ‘EU-based claims’ from a total
of 3541 claims.
8 We aggregated action forms into the following broad categories: political
decision/executive action, verbal action (e.g. communication events such as
press releases) and protest/direct democratic action. We considered as
conflictual all those claims in which protest/direct democratic action was
used, plus all those accompanied by criticism of their targets. Indeed, calls
and appeals for specific targets may be made either in a neutral sense or with
expressions of criticism or support for the actors they target. We measured
the evaluation of addressees, giving a score of –1 for negative judgements
and +1 for support, with 0 for a neutral position.
9 The attitude towards increased European integration (Figure 3) was recorded,
for both samples, only for claims that had a European dimension in the issue
scope. Position scores were computed only for cells with 5 or more cases.
Overall, the mean for all actors during the period under study (N claims =
1623) is +0.24 (+0.30 in 1990; +0.25 in 1995; +0.31 in 2000; +0.11 in 2002); for
institutional actors +0.28 (+0.37 in 1990; +0.27 in 1995; +0.36 in 2000; +0.14 in
2002), for social movements +0.10 (0.00 in 1990 and 1995; +0.19 in 2000; +0.03
in 2002), for economic interest groups +0.14 (–0.11 in 1990; +0.30 in 1995; +0.21
in 2000; +0.04 in 2002), for parties +0.10 (+0.17 in 1990 and 1995; +0.20 in 2000;
–0.12 in 2002), and for the media +0.13 (0.00 in 1990; +0.17 in 2000; +0.09 in
2002).
10 Parties and the media expressed significant support for Europe only in the
debate about European integration (from about +0.15 to +0.17); in all the other
policy fields they expressed neutral or ambivalent positions.
11 The list of our interview partners can be found in the Appendix.
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